An effective monitoring plan must be site-specific, risk based and adaptive. This paper examines the development of such a CO 2 storage monitoring plan for the offshore North Sea Goldeneye candidate CO 2 storage complex. Significant detail is shown to demonstrate the level of analysis required to mature a CO 2 storage project to a level at which a permit application is possible.
Introduction
After significant work spanning a number of years, it can be argued that the Goldeneye candidate storage complex in the Central North Sea is the most mature CO 2 storage candidate in the UK. The site has the additional advantage of demonstrating the re-use of existing oil and gas infrastructure. This existing infrastructure also paves the way for cost-effective future appraisal and expansion into massive saline aquifer systems that are either laterally connected to the Goldeneye field or that overlie the field This paper describes the development of a monitoring plan for the storage of CO 2 from a post combustion gas-fired power station into the candidate store.
The EU directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide
Monitoring is essential to assess whether injected CO 2 is behaving as expected, whether any migration or leakage occurs, and whether any identified leakage is damaging 1]. Monitoring also provides the evidence that allows transfer or responsibility for the storage site to the The responsibility for the storage site, including specific legal obligations, should be transferred to the competent authority, if and when all available evidence indicates that the stored CO 2 will be completely and permanently contained.
It can therefore be said that monitoring aims to provide evidence of containment and conformance during the injection phase of a project, and during this phase and the subsequent post-injection, prehandover phase, builds up a body of evidence that indicates that the CO 2 will be completely and permanently contained.
From an operator perspective monitoring must yield clear answers to the above requirements so that operational decisions can be taken based on the monitoring results. Monitoring must also be exactly fit for purpose so as not add to the cost of storage unnecessarily.
Structure of the paper
This paper starts by describing the store that will be monitored. It then follows the structure laid out in Fig. 1 below which details the steps in developing the monitoring plan. At each step selected key elements are described fully to explicitly demonstrate the level of detail required to develop a plan to the level where it is ready for regulatory submission. 
Description of the storage site and complex
During this paper we adopt the terminology used in the European Union (EU) directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide [1] . This leads us to define a storage site and storage complex. Schematic to show the orange (shallower coloured surface within orange lower coloured surface that extends beyond the storage complex. Fig. 2 shows a schematic of the Goldeneye candidate storage complex and project boundaries to be monitored, while Fig. 3 contains a geological cross section . The storage site is defined as the pore volume in that part of the Upper and Lower Valhall Formations (which includes Captain Sandstone reservoir of the Goldeneye field but excludes the thin section of Upper Valhall Group mudstone surmounting the Captain sandstone) that exists within a short distance of the original oil-water-contact (OOWC) of the Goldeneye hydrocarbon field. Vertically, the storage site includes all rock between the mapped base of the Lower Valhall Group and the mapped top of the Captain Sandstone Member. The pore volume that is proposed to be licensed extends beyond the original boundary of the gas condensate field to the east, south and west. This additional volume is intended to accommodate the potential movement below the OOWC of a plume of CO 2 if the viscous forces of injection push the CO 2 away from a gravity stable equilibrium into what is termed a as illustrated in Fig. 4C . After cessation of injection, the buoyancy of the CO 2 with respect to the aquifer brine and the energy of the aquifer itself will re-establish the gravity stable equilibrium and will return any free CO 2 that remains within this tongue to the pore volume that exists above the original oil-water contact of the field. The extension to the north, which encompasses an area where no Captain Sandstone Member rocks have been encountered, is to accommodate geophysical uncertainty around the position of the northerly pinchout of the reservoir.
The storage seal is formed by four sealing formations that directly overlie one another. These are: part of the Upper Valhall Formation that sits atop the Captain Sandstone Member, the Rødby Formation shales, the Hidra Formation and the Plenus Marl Bed of the Chalk Group.
The secondary containment complex ends vertically at the complex seal, provided by the Dornoch Mudstone Unit and the Lista Mudstone. Secondary storage is provided by the formations of the Chalk Group and the Tertiary-aged Montrose and Moray Groups that exist between the top of the Plenus Marl Bed and the base of the Dornoch Mudstone Unit. The extension of the storage complex to the north-west reflects the regional dip of the Montrose Group and acknowledges that any migrating CO 2 will move preferentially in this direction under the influence of buoyancy forces. This was indicated by modelling of the extent of CO 2 plume movement within the Mey Sandstone Member of the Lista Formation.
CO 2 injection plan
In addition to the static geological details, the monitoring plan needs to take the site specific dynamic history into account.
The Goldeneye field is penetrated by five existing development and four abandoned exploration and appraisal wells. CO 2 will be injected using the former gas production wells that will be converted into CO 2 injectors. One of these wells will serve as a monitoring well. The injection target is the upper part of 2 will displace and mix with the remaining reservoir hydrocarbon and the aquifer water that has swept the reservoir during production. The CO 2 will refill the voided hydrocarbon structure. As the refilling takes place there will be a front of CO 2 moving though the original hydrocarbon volume, displacing the invaded water. Viscous forces will tend to dominate over gravity forces and there is potential for a tongue of CO 2 to move below the original hydrocarbon water contact (Fig. 4C ) the so-. When injection ceases, gravity (buoyancy) forces will dominate and any mobile down dip CO 2 will re-equilibrate and flow up structure (Fig. 4D ). 
Project phases and geological domains
To achieve the aims of a Measurement, Monitoring and Verification (MMV) plan, all phases of the project pre-injection, injection, post-injection and post-closure need to be monitored, as well as all the environmentally sensitive domains in proximity to the storage complex. This can only be achieved against agreed base levels, which allow accurate accounting of CO 2 stored in the storage complex.
The storage complex is divided up into a number of environmentally sensitive domains. The domains are the geosphere, hydrosphere, (marine) biosphere and atmosphere and shown in Fig. 5 . The domains are categorized in an areal and depth sense.
For the offshore candidate store, the fresh water hydrosphere is absent. Wells are treated as a separate category because key risks are associated with well integrity of the former production wells, which will be turned into injectors after workover, and the abandoned production & appra a isal wells in the area. 
Input 1: Site specific containment risk assessment and migration scenarios
An effective monitoring plan cannot exist without a containment risk assessment. This allows the identification of potential leak paths in the store and enables the plan to focus in on key areas.
The risk assessment is detailed in the partner paper at this conference [2] and will not be discussed in detail here. A summary is shown schematically in Fig. 6 which highlights the progression from threats through to potential migration scenarios. Monitoring and remediation are a key supplement to the manmade passive engineered barriers of injection wells. In order to develop effective MMV base case and contingency plans, it is crucial to identify the likeliest migration scenarios based on the residual risk after natural and engineered barriers for each threat and migration mechanism. This information can be used to select and implement a monitoring technique that is able to detect the early migration as well as to delineate the source thereby providing a reactive/monitoring barrier in combination with a preventative or corrective measure.
The migration scenarios are grouped by categorising the threats and considering the combination of migration pathway mechanisms as shown in Fig. 6 .C and listed in Table 1 . These migration scenarios are used as a basis for data acquisition and technology selection for MMV base case and contingency plans. In a migration scenario, migration paths are combined because CO 2 can start to migrate from one path and then continue through another. Therefore, not all migration paths lead to standalone scenarios. For example, caprock integrity failure: migration that starts due to a failure in caprock integrity could continue through a well or fault, which would increase its potential to become a leak. Another scenario that also considers multiple migration mechanisms would be lateral migration in a reservoir quality overburden formation below the complex seal after the CO 2 has migrated through a well or fault. Both of these scenarios involve a combination of vertical and lateral migration.
Input 2: Tools and techniques
A list of monitoring techniques/technologies has been created based on experience from internal and external demonstration and commercial Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) projects, augmented with experience from hydrocarbon monitoring in Shell, project partners, government bodies and academia. This list may grow during a project as new monitoring technologies and insights emerge. Technologies on the list were ranked based on following criteria listed in Table 2 . How well the measurements provided by these techniques address/identify the subsurface risks associated with CO2 containment within the storage complex.
Measurability
The ability to identify property contrast during injection and in post injection/closure phases compared to background condition (pre-injection) and whether the property contrast exceeds the detection limit for the technique.
Quantitative vs. qualitative measurements Quantification will be necessary in the unlikely event of CO2 leakage to the seabed.
Operational constraints
The ability to apply the technique in the project environment based on its compatibility with location (onshore/offshore), environmental factors (terrain, local fauna, water depth, platform location, well location, borehole access etc.) and other users of the sea (such as trawlers).
Competitive application If two or more technologies fulfill similar monitoring objectives, the study favours the technology having the least operational risk, the least cost and that which gains optimal information.
Proven technology Technologies are either proven for CCS/EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) application, proven for hydrocarbon maturation or are in the research and development process. Technologies that are not ful Technology Maturation Plan.
Appendix A lists the technologies screened. Details about the technology feasibility for all considered technologies and the screening processes applied to each monitoring technique in each domain can be found in [3] and [4] on the UK Government Office of Carbon Capture and Storage website.
Ranking of tools and techniques
An industry wide standard way to communicate the value of the information that the selected techniques bring to the MMV plan is a cost/benefit plot. This approach replicates the MMV screening for 5].
technologies. Fig. 7 shows an example of this plot for the technologies selected for the MMV plan. 
Input 3: Discrimination criteria choosing which techniques to use and when

Value drivers
The choice of what tool or techniques to apply is often complicated and requires the weighing of multiple competing demands. It is therefore key to define the project s monitoring value drivers. These are listed for the candidate project in Table 3 . Note that the fact that the project is a First Of A Kind and the requirement to prove to all stakeholders that this new CO 2 mitigation technique is effective has the potential to increase the level of monitoring above technically indicated level. In many cases more monitoring will lead to a higher level of certainty and, for example, a lower security payment on liability transfer Lower frequency/certainty in monitoring can mean that a larger leak can develop before it is detected. This can lead to exposure to larger EU ETS (emissions trading scheme) credit purchases
Ranking criteria
Once the drivers were selected, ranking criteria were developed based on these drivers. These were outcome based and were grouped into: Does not satisfy, Just satisfies, Comfortably satisfies f f , and Exceeds.
For External stakeholders, and concentrating on seabed monitoring as an example, performing benthic monitoring only when a leak is suspected did not satisfy the driver, while performing all but continuous, detailed, benthic monitoring across the whole storage complex (requiring a fleet of boats) was viewed to exceed the value driver.
Monitoring techniques were grouped into themes for example continuous, all domains, absolute minimum, stepped and were tested against the value drivers.
Monitoring philosophy
The monitoring philosophy was developed as consequence of the ranking exercise. A number of monitoring philosophies exist.
It is possible to develop a monitoring plan that monitors everything in minute detail all the time. In so doing there are significant consequences environmental (emissions from survey shipping movements, on local fauna from repeated shooting of seismic surveys and potentially on the sea bed if drilling operations are performed); safety (multiple helicopter flights, boat movements in rough seas and other offshore hazards); and cost escalation.
On the other hand, it is possible to develop a plan that detects potential leaks, and then triggers a contingency monitoring plan if and when needed. This has a lower cost and HSE footprint. This is the stepped monitoring philosophy that has been adopted in a number of other projects and was also adopted here (Fig. 8.) Primary monitoring is based on detection of migration or non-conformance. If primary monitoring detects a potential irregularity, then contingency monitoring takes place. Contingency monitoring is focused on confirming that there is migration and delineating or pinpointing it. The final step, if unexpected migration is confirmed, is to define the size/magnitude of the migration, especially if it has migrated to surface. 
Output 1: Base case monitoring plan
The ranking exercises discussed in section 5, combined with the understanding of the effectiveness of each tool in relation to each leak path, led to the selection of groups of technologies for each monitoring domain and project phase.
For each potential migration pathway and technique a detailed assessment of the technology and its responses was made, against the MMV criteria and the monitoring steps. Space does not permit the inclusion of all the techniques and domains (see [3] for a detailed discussion), but one example is shown below.
Saturation Logging and Sampling S S example
This logging is targeted at conformance rather than containment, its aim being to confirm and constrain the dynamic simulation modelling by providing information on the movement of the CO 2 front within the store. Dynamic simulation prediction drives the start and duration of the programme. It suggests the timing when the CO 2 plume will reach the monitoring well and the number of saturation data points required to characterise the model. Current dynamic simulation results (see Fig. 9 ) suggest the programme should start between Year 5 and Year 10 of injection, with a frequency of once per year assuming all four injectors inject at the same rate. Year 5 is the time when the CO 2 plume is predicted to reach the monitoring well, whilst yearly frequency is deemed sufficient to capture the CO 2 concentration and column increment. If a monitoring well has significant water in the wellbore (post recompletion), this will be displaced to CH 4 or CO 2 or a mixture of both once a flux of these fluids/gasses starts to pass through the well completion (sand screens). This displacement is accompanied by a pronounced change in the wellbore pressures as the gradient of the well fluids alters. This pressure change is an additional indication that the front has impacted the wells and can act as a trigger for saturation logging and sampling.
It is essential to keep the logging suite similar to the baseline and consistent throughout the periodical logging runs in order to provide consistent background for the interpretation. Pulsed Neutron Capture (PNC) tool and gradiometer derived fluid profiling will be used for reference for deciding sampling locations. Fluid samples will be taken in the water column (below the gas-water interface) to examine CO 2 dissolution in water, in the gas column just above gas-water interface to examine CO 2 concentration and the top of the gas column to examine remaining light hydrocarbon concentration. In both samples of the gas column, the ratio of the light hydrocarbon mixture to CO 2 will be investigated and more than one sample may be required at one location.
Technology development is also being pursued in the development of a permanent downhole CO 2 detection tool that can be deployed on an unmanned offshore platform. This would give better temporal resolution and also remove the need for the offshore wireline operations required for sample collection improving safety and reducing cost.
Base case monitoring plan
The whole analysis process led to the complete base case monitoring plan which includes the preinjection baseline, the post-injection check against the baseline, and the planned monitoring during and post-injection. Table 4 gives the detail of the plan, and a schematic representation is show in Fig. 10 . 
Output 2: Contingency monitoring plan
The aim of the contingency monitoring plan is to respond to suspected irregularities. The contingency plan is trigger-based and will be executed when significant irregularities are suspected. The base plan acts to detect suspected irregularities.
The contingency plan is site-specific and based on the migration path risks described earlier. The various monitoring techniques in the base plan act as part of the active barriers that detect potential CO 2 migration along suspected migration paths. Interpretation of the monitoring data from the contingency plan will delineate the plume in terms of location and areal extent, followed by physical or modelled quantification of the expected irregularity. The results of the contingency monitoring will inform the choice of the appropriate corrective action and the reapplication of the contingency monitoring will ascertain the efficacy of any corrective measures deployed.
The detailed contingency plans for all scenarios are given in [4] . In order to describe the thought process one example is given below.
Action Plan for migration pathways through injection wells
Late in the during injection phase, well injection pressures at the sand face could exceed hydrostatic pressure and a combination of temperature and pressure may induce local fractures. The risk assessment shows that there is a minute possibility of fault reactivation. In addition, potential pathways for migration up to surface could occur along the casing in the case of a failure of the cement bond.
All injection wells tie back to the Goldeneye platform. Continuous monitoring data are collected by Distributed Temperature Sensors (DTS), annular pressure and downhole pressure gauges, plus a seafloor geochemical probe. These are all aimed at detecting migration in the injection wells. The planned seismic surveys back this up as they have the ability to detect migration plumes in the subsurface, for example if the CO 2 accumulates underneath the secondary seal. Potential migration paths associated with the injection wells are shown in Table 5 . Were detectable migration to take place along one of these paths, anomalies in the monitoring data would then trigger the following action plan: 1. DTS/pressure gauge anomalies: check for potential leaks and their location using the data. In case of a suspected leak, check the geochemical probe data for anomalies. If a leak is established, then determine if a seismic or MBES survey plus other seabed or sea surface monitoring needs to be used to further delineate. This is followed by quantification f f of the migration if it reaches the seabed. 2. Seafloor probe or sample anomalies: consider a leak close to seafloor. Establish if additional seismic, MBES surveys, or seabed sampling is required for delineation in combination with forward modelling. 3. Seismic data anomalies: first determine the migration location. If the CO 2 plume is detected in the shallow sections, then consider additional seabed sample locations and geochemical seafloor probe placement. At some point a seismic or MBES survey may be required to further delineate the plume. Combining the monitoring data and forward models may delineate and quantify the extent of the plume when it reaches the seabed. If the plume is deep and below the Dornoch/Lista complex seal, then determine the appropriate repeat seismic survey frequency by forward modelling and plan further monitoring to delineate extent of the plume. In each case above, confirmation of a significant irregularity would trigger the corrective measures plan.
Updating the plan
The monitoring plan will be reviewed by the regulator on a minimum of a five year interval. Updates will be on the basis of revised static and dynamic models that incorporate the results from monitoring and verification surveys. Even with the most rigorously designed static and dynamic geological earth models, deviations from predicted injection behaviour may be expected. As such, it is important to adopt an adaptive learning process.
Updated strategies should address any shortcomings in history matching and could include options for new/updated technologies or technology improvements. History matching is the comparison of observed behaviour of the injected CO 2 in the storage complex with the behaviour predicted in the dynamic modelling approach. The monitoring methodology should be changed if the updated strategy improves the accuracy of the reported data, unless this is technically not feasible or a cost/benefit analysis rules out a technique.
There are three types of circumstances that would initiate a revision to the original monitoring plan. Unexpected plume migration behaviour during injection.
Migration of CO 2 out of the primary containment formation but within the storage complex. Changes in the cost and detection limits of monitoring technologies. This can be expected to occur as monitoring technologies for CCS are in their infancy, especially in the offshore environment. The first two circumstances identified above impact the storage complex risk assessment, which is tightly linked to the monitoring plan.
Conclusion
This paper only touches on the full complexity of the evaluation required to match the potential monitoring tools and techniques with the time dependent site specific risks. However, it does describe the logical risk based approach taken to developing a cost effective, trigger based plan designed to adapt to the uncertainties inherent in a CO 2 geostorage system that might be included in a full MMV plan. 
Appendix A. Technology Catalogue
